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Abstract:
This study analyses the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish currencies by examining the statistical 
characteristics of the Swiss franc as well as the ECB monetary policy in order to indicate shocks 
in these markets between 2002 and 2013. The abundance of monetary easing decisions can 
be used as a  viable sign of market misbehaviour in addition to the low probability of extreme 
exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed, the temporal distribution of extreme currency fluctuations 
provides vital information about the nature of the recent crisis. Contagions can be defined as 
increased correlations during periods of crisis, while divergence means a  significant decrease 
in this regard. Methodologically, common movements in this study were calculated by using 
DCC-GARCH modelling. The findings of this study underline the special features of the Swiss franc 
exchange rate, notably that its extreme fluctuations can be managed by using swap agreements 
and that it tended towards divergences during the crisis era. These results support the idea 
of avoiding lending in reserve currencies.
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1.  Introduction
The Czech, Hungarian, and Polish national banks follow an independent  oating currency 
regime despite their future obligation to adopt the euro and have the primary statutory objective 
of achieving and maintaining price stability. The combination of a harmonised monetary aim 
and  oating currency regime is the product of the unique style of capitalism characterised by 
underdeveloped capital markets, poor savings accumulation, and overconcentrated banking 
systems (Farkas, 2011), resulting in substantial capital imports that accelerated the domestic 
credit booms in the pre-crisis era (Kovács, 2009, Árvai et al., 2009).
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This study analyses the patterns of currency  uctuations and common movements 
in Swiss franc (CHF) denomination because of its signi  cant impact on Hungarian bank 
solvency. In particular, it examines the inadequacy of CHF as an underlying currency 
for foreign currency loans (FCYLs) for Central and Eastern European (CEE) households 
because of its special role as a reserve currency. A reserve currency suffers a sudden 
appreciation owing to enormous liquidity in  ows under mistrustful periods, which erodes 
the credit quality of FCYL debtors. This is important because FCYLs have a signi  cant 
share of the overall loans market in 18 EU Member States, especially outside the Eurozone, 
while CHF loans have a signi  cant share in Slovenia, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Austria, 
Poland, and Hungary (Yesin, 2013). 
Although FX liquidity shortages have been manageable by using temporal swap 
agreements and repos over the past  ve years, this approach is only adequate to manage 
the liabilities of banks. The heterogeneity of debtors makes it dif  cult to draw any  rm 
conclusions about their FX risk-bearing capacities, while conventional channels of FX risk 
management (e.g. futures or options markets) are not always adequate for them (especially 
for households). This study thus focuses on central banks’ actions in order to capture their 
direct or indirect impacts on spot currency pricing. Methodologically, we adopt a CEE sample 
between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2013 (N=3035), using daily closing data1 on the 
Czech koruna (CZK), Hungarian forint (HUF), and Polish zloty (PLN). Capital markets are 
complex networks with extreme market events such as tail properties (Gabaix et al., 2003),
which thereby encourage collective market behaviour (Bonanno et al., 2001).
The present study is structured into three parts. The  rst section summarises the policy 
context of currency markets to introduce the central bank reaction curves that are used 
to study the eras of monetary tightening (from 1 March 2005 to 31 July 2007) and easing 
(from 1 August 2007 to 31 December 2013) by the European Central Bank (ECB). In this 
section, we also distinguish two speci  c crisis periods, namely the subprime crisis between 
1 August 2007 and 31 January 2010 and the sovereign crisis between 1 February 2010 and 
31 December 2013. The next section presents the proposed market model, de  nes extreme 
 uctuations and collective types of behaviour, and summarises the methodological background 
to capture them. The last section explains the empirical results on the temporal properties 
of extreme currency  uctuations and collective behaviour and then concludes the study by 
evaluating the danger of CHF denomination for CEE currencies. The relevance of these 
 ndings is supported by the current FCYL crisis in Hungary caused by euro crisis-triggered 
CHF appreciation in the medium run as well as the mandatory EUR adoption in the long run.
2.  Policy Context
This section focuses on the policy aspects and past reactions of Eurozone monetary policy 
in order to study monetary tightening and easing decisions. Our research adopts reaction 
curves to de  ne different periods of the permanent crisis of the past  ve years. After 
the introduction of the primary objective of the ECB, discount rates, regular and irregular 
liquidity programmes, and swap lines are analysed to distinguish the two periods 
of the crisis. Although decisions about the discount rate have a trivial impact on exchange 
rates because of interest rate parity, this tool becomes obsolete in a de  ation environment. 
1 The database of the Polish National Bank was the data source: http://www.nbp.pl/homen.aspx?c=/
ascx/ArchAen.ascx.
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FX liquidity programmes such as swap lines and repo contracts focus on the management 
of supply shortages in a de jure independent  oating regime.
The subprime crisis started as an asset-side problem in the United States, but it affected bank 
networks on a global scale as a liability-side problem between 1 August 2007 and 31 January 
2010. Ultimately, this issue was managed through the introduction of zero bound interest 
rates and FX liquidity programmes among key central banks as well as cooperation between 
the ECB and the Danish, Swiss, and CEE central banks. The second phase affected the 
sovereign bonds markets in both the United States and the Eurozone between 1 February 2010
and 31 December 2013. Joint actions here focused on swap lines, while each key central 
bank also developed its own toolbox to better manage the yield curve.
2.1  Monetary Policy of the ECB
The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks is to achieve and maintain 
price stability, as  nancial stability is crucial because the transmission of monetary policy 
can be hampered when massive  nancial turbulences occur (ECB, 2011). According to 
Borio (2014), the key central banks were relatively lucky because they were able to support 
 nancial stability without endangering price stability.
The  rst soft easing steps were taken in the third quarter of 2007, affecting reserve 
policy, while the  rst temporal swap agreement was introduced at the end of that year. The 
ECB started to defend against in  ation by increasing discount rates in the  rst three quarters 
of 2008, but the collapse of Lehman Brothers caused a sudden decrease in discount rates. In 
2011, there were weak attempts to increase discount rates, but these were inadequate to abandon 
the zero bound interest rate policy given the pessimistic mood still present in the market. 
Indeed, the toolbox of monetary policy instruments widened constantly, with open market 
operations and  ne-tuning operations enhanced by using non-standard measures including the 
second covered bond purchase programme and the Securities Markets Programme.
The swap lines of USD liquidity providers became popular in the early phase of the 
crisis as a temporary tool to manage the lack of foreign liquidity after December 2007. 
As BIS (2011) and Ács (2011) point out, their rising popularity was a strong indicator 
of currency market misbehaviour. Indeed, these temporary solutions became so successful 
that after a short break between February 2010 and May 2010, they were used until 
November 2013, when they were converted into standing swap arrangements2. There 
were also numerous enhancements to USD liquidity-providing operations; for example, 
the initial one-month maturity auction was expanded with overnight, one-week, and 
three-month maturities as well as with biweekly allocations in 2008. In addition, bilateral 
CHF–EUR3 and GBP–EUR4 swap agreements were established on 4 November 2008 and 
17 December 2010, respectively, while CEE and Danish central banks were supported by 
repo and swap contracts at the end of 20085 (BIS, 2011; Antal and Gereben, 2011). The 
market situation seemed to become more intense in November 2011, when a framework 
2 Press release: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr131031.en.html.
3 Press release: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2009/html/pr090116.en.html.
4 Press release: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr101217.en.html.
5 Loan-to-deposit ratios exceeded the level of 100% in our sample (except for the Czech Republic), 
weakening banks’ liquidity positions and creating constant demand for FX liquidity (Kovács, 2009, 
EBF, 2012).
681Volume 24 |  Number 06 | 2015 PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS
for bilateral swap agreements in USD, CAD, JPY, EUR, GBP, and CHF was announced 
by the Bank of Canada, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, ECB, Federal Reserve, and Swiss 
National Bank6.
Figure 1  |  Signifi cant Decisions on Monetary Easing and Tightening by the Governing Council 
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Note: ‘1’: easing, ‘-1’: tightening
Source: author’s calculations, based on ECB (2002–2012)
Figure 1 presents the Governing Council’s responses to monetary easing according 
to the annual reports of the ECB. Two phases of the crisis were distinguished by the 
temporary end of swap agreements in January 2010. The subprime phase (1 August 2007 
to 31 January 2010, from N=633) had one intense period at the fall of Lehman Brothers, 
while the sovereign phase (1 February 2010 to 31 December 2013, N=990) was characterised 
by different stages of Greek, Spanish, and Irish close-to-default stories and grave CHF 
appreciation.
3.  Defi nitions and Methodology
The current study focuses on extreme currency  uctuations and  nancial contagion, 
a widely studied subject with a broad variety of de  nitions and methodological back-
grounds (Kuusk and Paas, 2013). Common movements in the capital market are mostly 
based on the exploration of variables (Van Horen et al., 2006), while a multivariable 
generalised autoregression conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model-supported 
dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) estimation is a common tool for currency-related 
analyses (Kuper and Lestano, 2007; Babetskaia-Kukharchuk et al., 2008; Stavárek, 2009).
The contagion literature is supported by experiences of the recent crisis, which presented 
6 Press release: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111130.en.html.
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unique and enormous changes in currency correlations (Muller and Verschoor, 2009; 
Haile, and Pozo, 2008). Currency mismatch was a key factor for the  nancial crises in 
Hungary and Poland (Goldstein and Turner, 2004; Dietrich et al., 2011), which can be 
fatal when strongly related to the bank sector as it was in Hungary (Kaminsky and Rein-
hart, 1999)7. Moreover, the contagion literature for CEE currencies is supported by the 
 eld of euro convergence analyses (Stavárek, 2009), because it indicates future ERM II 
readiness. Higher correlation can mitigate asymmetric shocks (Babetskaia-Kukharchuk 
et al., 2008), while the historically high level could eliminate the need to apply expensive 
FX risk-covering techniques. Dynamics are synchronised among CEE currencies and 
EUR, requiring deeper monetary policy and FX liquidity coordination8.
3.1   Defi nitions 
The scope of the current study requires precise de  nitions for phenomena related 
to extreme events, such as extreme and normal returns, subsets of collective behaviour 
(e.g. contagion), and divergence and interdependence among the complex system of 
capital markets. To understand the nature of capital markets, it is necessary to choose 
a reliable model that allows extreme jumps and collective types of behaviour. A more 
heterogeneous and hierarchic market should be assumed than suggested by the ef  cient 
market hypothesis. Therefore, the null hypothesis of ef  cient markets will be tested 
against the alternative hypothesis of complex markets (see Fama, 1970, who requires 
the lack of autocorrelation and normally distributed returns for ef  ciency).
To model the network structure of a market (n) (1), it is necessary to de  ne the actors (a),
shape of the network (sh), and level of market ef  ciency (e) to understand the time series: 
 n(a, sh, e). (1)
The mainstream model of ef  cient markets (2) has the following structure:
 rn(ar , shr , ef) ,  (2)
where rn denotes normally distributed returns, ar represents rational actors (Simon, 1955), 
shr is random networks (Erd s and Rényi, 1960), and ef is the sign of Fama-type ef  -
ciency. Erd s–Rényi random networks are capable of modelling competitive and ef  cient 
markets with dynamic recombination and fast information propagation, but they cannot 
describe preferential connectivity (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). From a statistical perspec-
tive, they thus need normally distributed, homoscedastic, and non-autocorrelated returns.
To describe real-world capital markets, extreme jumps and forms of collective types 
of behaviour must be included. An extreme event can be de  ned as a wx W event for 
a W stochastic variable with a wx>>wn or wx<<wn signi  cantly higher impact than that 
expected, in a limited time and space with a p(wx )<<p(wn ) signi  cantly lower probability 
than that expected (Jentsch et al., 2006). The dynamic property of extreme events is related 
to their de  nition proposed by Jentsch et al. (2006), namely that ‘power-laws represent 
7 The Czech currency can suffer from  nancial crises as well, but without the possibility of the lethal 
combination of poor loan-to-deposit ratios and foreign currency lending as well as it being under 
better  scal circumstances.
8 The relationship between volatility and liquidity has changed notably during and after the crisis 
 on the stock markets as well, see Váradi (2012). 
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scale-free systems’. Extreme events are not generated randomly; rather, they occur in 
systems with complex dynamics that are far from equilibrium and dominated by the system’s 
variability and collective effects (Kantz et al., 2006). Therefore, we sort capital market 
returns into two complementary subsets, namely extreme and normal returns, according 
to the de  nition of extreme events.
De  nition: normal returns rn have a higher probability than 5% or  t the projected 
theoretical normal distribution well. This de  nition suggests that the subsample of normal 
returns has close to level 3 kurtosis (fourth moment), which would be useful to test the 
results of the separation in the future.
De  nition: extreme returns rx can be de  ned as an extreme event in capital markets. 
They have both a really low probability p(rx )<<p(rn ) and a high impact on the tails 
rx-<<rn<<rx+. This de  nition is thus also able to meet the requirements put forward by 
Jiawei and Micheline (2004) about extreme values. Two approaches are applied in this 
study to capture extreme returns: one based on low probability and one that utilises the fat-
tailed distribution property.
De  nition: improbable returns rvx (3) refer to those returns that are under the 5% 
probability threshold. This approach can be rigid on the third and fourth moments:
 prvx < 5 %. (3)
De  nition: fat-tailed returns rfx (4) result from an extreme change in the mj market, 
causing fat tails for the rmj return’s probability distribution. This occurrence is related to 
the skewness of the distribution, although their probability and value differ markedly from 
expected returns E(r). This means that fat-tailed returns can be selected from the difference 
in the tails between the theoretical normal distribution and empirical data, utilising 
the latter’s ‘S-shaped’ form in QQ plots:
 rfx +  E(r),  or E(r) rfx – , where  prfx pE(r)  (4)
Both improbable and fat-tailed returns are referred to as extreme returns in the present 
study.
De  nition: a capital market shock captures the ability of returns to  uctuate between 
the rn normal subset and rx extreme subset. rn/x   0 indicates the existence of this transition 
between both subsets (5), while rn/x = 0 indicates its absence (i.e. a sign of an ef  cient 
market only with normal returns) (6):
 0 , i i
m m
n xr r  (5)
 
/ 0  i i i
m m m
n x nr r r  . (6)
If extreme returns represent a higher volume than that expected from the normal 
distribution, the capital market should be modelled as a complex system (as suggested 
by the dynamic properties of extreme events) (7):
 rn/x (abr , shs , el),  (7)
where rn/x denotes a capital market shock due to the fat-tailed distribution of returns, 
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network, and el denotes the lack of ef  ciency because of autocorrelated and heteroscedastic 
time series. Scale-free complex networks were described by Barabási and Albert (1999) 
to explain internal heterogeneity through preferential connections, which could be res-
ponsible for spontaneous synchronisations (‘large cooperative phenomena’) or phase 
transitions such as the structural collapse of the former market hierarchy. Because these 
systems are far from equilibrium as self-organised criticality describes, extreme events 
are inherent properties of the system that are indicated by the power-law distribution. 
The ability of scale-invariant complex networks to model capital markets was evaluated 
by Vitali et al. (2011) at a global scale and by Benedek et al. (2007) for Hungary.
Bonanno et al. (2001) summarise the three main statistical phenomena for a complex 
capital market: time series have both short- and long-range memories with asymptotic 
stationarity, there is high sectoral intraday cross-correlation, and collective market 
behaviour emerges during extreme market events. The latter property is important for 
the current study. Collective market types of  behaviour have three well-known versions 
in the literature: contagion, divergence, and interdependence. These phenomena relate to 
how market mood changes based on the categorisation of different assets or countries.
A three-level de  nition was published by the World Bank for the contagion effect 
to capture the different dynamics in real economies and capital markets. The restrictive 
de  nition9 of contagion focuses on cross-country correlations, which increase during times 
of crisis relative to tranquil times. 
De  nition: contagion (8) occurs between mkmj markets when the 
mkmj cross-market 
correlation becomes signi  cantly high because of the shock derived from one market 
(rn/x
m) spreading to others or as a result of other external factors (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, 
Campbell et al., 2002, Bekaert et al., 2005):
 
/ 0 k j k ji
m m m mm
n x n xr . (8)
De  nition: interdependence (9) occurs between mkmj markets when the 
mkmj cross-
market correlation is not signi  cantly different, but the level of correlation is consistently 
high (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002):
 
/ 0 k j k ji
m m m mm
n x n xr . (9)
De  nition: divergence (10) occurs between mkmj markets when the 
mkmj cross-market 
correlation becomes signi  cantly low because of the shock derived from one market (rn/x
m) 
spreading to others or as a result of other external factors (Bearce, 2002a):
 / 0 k j k ji
m m m mm
n x n xr . (10)
De  nition: autonomous monetary policy allows central banks to set prime rates 
according to the prevailing macroeconomic conditions, and it thus can be viewed as 
a range of decisions (Bearce, 2002b). Autonomy is related to independence from mone-
tary policies in the key currency areas and can be reduced by the degree of monetary 
interdependence, which is based on trade relationships and cross-border production 
chains (Plümper and Troeger, 2008). Global liquidity is able to limit this autonomy 
by increasing the vulnerabilities of a  nancial system through substantial mismatches 
9 See http://go.worldbank.org/JIBDRK3YC0, which was also cited by Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
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across currencies, maturities, and countries, while the supply of global liquidity stems from 
one or more ‘core countries’ (BIS, 2011). This de  nition is necessary since the formerly 
presented collective behaviours are able to hinder monetary autonomy because of their 
impact on the external debt of the public and private sectors as well as on price stability.
3.2   Methods
Contagions and divergences between currencies were tested through three steps:  rst, 
market ef  ciency was tested, then extreme trading days and periods were cleared, and 
 nally the DCCs were calculated. The functions of the MFE and UCSD Matlab toolboxes 
were applied in this regard. Returns on an ef  cient capital market should be normally 
distributed and non-autocorrelated (Fama, 1970). In this study, returns were calculated 
as the logarithmic differentials of the currency rates. The de  nition of contagion and 
divergence requires conditional correlations as well, which can be biased by heter-
oscedasticity (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). A Jarque–Bera test was thus used to study 
the normal distribution, which is based on the third and fourth moments of the returns. 
To test the reduction of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, ARCH-LM and Ljung–
Box tests were utilised.
Extreme trading days were de  ned in two ways: (i) improbable returns were indi-
cated when their probability was less than 5% according to the empirical cumulative 
distribution function (this application is the simplest version of the Value-at-Risk approach) 
and (ii) fat-tailed returns were selected on the base logic of a QQ plot. QQ plots are common 
tools for visualising the normal distribution of time series (represented by a straight line), 
with dots signifying the empirical distribution. The normal distribution of the empirical 
data is observable if these dots  t the line; however, most  nancial data have an ‘S’ shape 
in the QQ plot, suggesting a power-law distribution and fat tails (Clauset el al., 2009). 
By relying on the de  nition of QQ plots proposed by Deutsch (2002), the above separation 
can be expressed in the following way (11):
1 1
1 1 /i iX P i N  for all i < N, therefore, 
2 2n ir X , 
2 2fx ir X ,
 2 2fx ir X ,      
    (11)
where  denotes the standardised normal distribution, Xi is the theoretical empirical stand-
ard normal distribution, N represents the sample number, and P is the probability. The 
theoretical empirical standard normal distribution is represented in the QQ plot by a line 
with a 2 + 2 Xi  slope. Therefore, it is reasonable to de  ne the tails through the QQ plot,
where the turning point of the extremity is de  ned as the  rst empirical data point in the 
lower quartile to the right of the normality line on the positive side and to the left of the 
normality line on the negative side. The entire time series can then be divided (12) into 
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where rempirical,i is the ith element of the empirical distribution and  rtheoreticalnormal, i  denotes 
the projected normal distribution, i < k < l.
Under the assumption of poor market ef  ciency, time series are mostly biased by 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity due to fat-tailed distributions and volatility clustering. 
This study follows the steps taken by Cappeiello et al. (2006) to  t DCC to the time series. 
First, heteroscedasticity must be ruled out by using univariate GARCH models to manage 
the unique volatility properties (see Stavárek, 2010) and then Engle’s (2002) DCCs are  tted 
to the homoscedastic residuals. For the univariate step, the Asymmetric Power GARCH 
(APARCH)10 model is the most powerful tool to handle the bias of heteroscedasticity due 
to the asymmetric fat-tailed assumptions of the distribution (Ding et al., 1993). Three 
parameters of APARCH have to be de  ned: p and q determine the lag number of residuals 
and volatility, while o is a non-negative scalar integer that represents the number of asy-
mmetric innovations. A further advantage of the APARCH model is its  exibility, as it 
is easy to convert both GJR GARCH and TARCH and the basic GARCH form. The lag 
length was optimised on a 1–4 scale and selected according to the estimation’s Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC). The DCCs were then  tted to the homoscedastic standardised 
residuals of the GARCH models in the multivariate case.
This study applies DCC-GARCH11 to analyse the daily common movements of the 
selected markets. Cross-market correlation is then compared by using both the Ansari–
-Bradley test and two-sided t-test because the variance test is not based on the assumption of 
a normal distribution, as in the case of the widely used t-tests. The contagions, divergences, 
and interdependences initiated by one market’s extreme days must be detected for 10 
intermarket correlations. First, however, it is necessary to decide between interdependence 
(non-signi  cant changes in correlations) and signi  cant correlation changes (such as 
divergence and contagion), which can be expressed by the overall weight of signi  cantly 
different correlations (13):
 1 2 1 3 1
, , , , , 50%,     
50%,   
j k n nm m m m m m m m




1,     
0,     
whencorrelations are significant different
s
whencorrelations arenonsignificant different
 and N denotes the number of 
involved market pairs. Contagions are characterised by signi  cantly higher correlations and 
divergences by signi  cantly lower correlations according to the following de  nitions (14). 
To select between these two forms, the following algorithm was used:
10 The estimation was based on the UCSD toolbox developed by Kevin Sheppard: 
http://www.kevinsheppard.com/wiki/UCSD_GARCH.
11 The estimation was based on the Oxford MFE toolbox developed by Kevin Sheppard: 
http://www.kevinsheppard.com/wiki/MFE_Toolbox.
1,     whencorrelations are significant differ nt
50%,   whereis interd pend c
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then 1 2 1 3 1
, , , , , 50%,   
50%,   
j k n nm m m m m m m m
g g g g whereis contagion
whereis divergenceN
 (14)
Thus, contagion was expressed by weighting the entire set of correlations, which is a strict 
rule.
4.  Results
CHF exchange rates were appreciating and relatively stable against other currencies before 
the subprime crisis (see Figure 2). The  rst phase of the crisis was then characterized by 
sharp depreciation for CEE currencies; however, an appreciating CHF typi  ed the second 
phase against the background of the rising euro crisis. This study describes this process 
during the crisis period. Speci  cally, the basis statistics of our sample currencies are  rst 
summarised after a comparison of the fourth moments to capture the tendency towards 
extreme changes. The occurrences of extreme  uctuations are then presented both in light 
of the time of crisis as well as signi  cant central bank measurements. Currency common 
movements are  nally analysed to present the time-varying dynamics.
Figure 2  |  CHF Exchange Rates against Other Currencies
Source: National Bank of Poland
CHF showed an excess fourth moments even before the crisis; indeed, even JPY had 
a lower volume of extreme returns (see Table 1). CHF denomination was reasonable only 
for EUR or USD, while CAD and the Norwegian krone also remained relatively stable 
during the crisis period. However, CHF provided the highest chance of improbable 
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Table 1  |  Fourth Moments of our Sample Currencies by Diff erent Denominators
































CAD 3.58 3.63 3.68 6.57 3.96 80%
JPY 4.03 3.66 3.86 7.01 4.02 0%
AUD 4.40 3.91 4.60 9.01 5.06 0%
XDR 4.97 4.01 4.22 10.01 3.58 0%
CHF 4.43 4.27 5.05 10.89 3.47 20%
DKK 4.27 4.73 5.99 16.76 3.76 0%
NOK 5.36 3.86 3.83 7.81 4.20 0%






























CAD 5.28 5.64 4.86 5.12 6.61 80%
JPY 6.67 7.96 5.86 6.76 6.14 0%
AUD 10.54 7.01 10.96 6.63 8.25 0%
XDR 5.88 7.52 8.41 6.48 7.31 0%
CHF 39.44 10.16 16.65 10.18 14.31 0%
DKK 14.77 9.07 12.30 8.56 5.41 0%
NOK 9.24 11.97 5.59 7.02 5.18 20%
GBP 6.27 5.93 6.48 5.30 7.84 0%
Source: author’s calculations
The null hypothesis of ef  cient markets was rejected (see Table 2) because of the lack 
of normally distributed returns as the zero p-values of the Jarque–Bera test suggest, even 
though only HUF and PLN seemed to be autocorrelated12. In addition, fat-tailness was 
indicated by excess kurtosis, where CHF denomination provided a higher volume of extreme 
returns. Heteroscedasticity appeared across the entire sample according to the results of the 
ARCH-LM test, while the logarithmic differentials as returns were covariance stationary 
according to the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test with auto lag selection. The results 
of the fat-tailed heteroscedastic returns also supported the idea of complex markets and 
motivated us to focus on CHF denomination more in depth.
12 Currencies are often non-autocorrelated contrary to the stock and bond markets 
(Kiss and Kosztopulosz, 2012).
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Jarque–Bera Ljung–Box ARCH-LM ADF
EUR/CHF 2.2811 58.2547 0.0000 0.0879 0.6414*** 0.0000
PLN/CHF -0.0317 11.4430 0.0000 0.0010** 0.0679*** 0.0000
CZK/CHF 0.7751 20.4055 0.0000 0.9222 0.9776*** 0.0000
HUF/CHF -0.0048 13.2339 0.0000 0.0109** 0.2468*** 0.0000
USD/CHF 0.2092 11.7481 0.0000 0.3686 0.5835*** 0.0000
Notes: * second lag, ** autocorrelation, *** heteroscedasticity
Source: author’s calculations
This setup simpli  es comparing the differences between these approaches: improbable 
returns represent the larger set of returns where a Value-at-Risk system could close the 
position, while fat-tailed returns represent special cases where ordinary assumptions such as 
normally distributed returns do not hold. Monetary easing and tightening periods were thus 
compared by using these data. The overall weight of extreme returns remained under 5% 
according to the applied methods. Further, improbable returns had a higher volume, while 
fat-tailed returns re  ected the asymmetric behaviour of USD and EUR with more extreme 
depreciation (see Figure 3). The pre-crisis era of tightening monetary policy lacked extreme 
returns in EUR. Moreover, USD provided more extreme  uctuations in the pre-crisis and 
subprime periods; however, this tendency changed during the sovereign crisis, when EUR 
presented more trading days with extreme depreciation. Therefore, the key currencies 
suffered more pricing uncertainty in the second phase of the crisis.
Figure 3  |  Number of Extreme Trading Days within the Monetary Periods of the ECB Key 



























Notes: Xim: improbable return, Xqq: fat-tailed return
Source: author’s calculations
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HUF provided the most trade days (178) with extreme returns in the sample, but PLN 
was remarkably close (159) (see Figure 4). CZK was similar to the key currencies with 131 
days (EUR: 124, USD: 126). CEE currencies were relatively stable before the crisis, but the 
subprime period resulted in extreme depreciation for both HUF and PLN. The sovereign 
crisis had an even more severe impact on the Hungarian currency than on the others. This 
result highlights the true nature of the sovereign phase: the importance of fundamental 
conditions. The result is clear: extreme trading days were concentrated during the crisis 
period. Monetary responses and currency  uctuations overlapped during the subprime 
crisis, contrary to the euro crisis measures, which had a strong impact on the currency 
market, ending the previous abundance of fat-tailed extreme jumps (except in Hungary). 
This  nding suggests that the ECB was able to push back pricing uncertainties at a low 
level: returns were not fat-tailed, but only according to the 5% probability threshold.
Figure 4  |  Number of Extreme Trading Days within the Monetary Periods of the ECB CEE 
Currencies with CHF Denomination
Notes: Xim: improbable return, Xqq: fat-tailed return
Source: author’s calculations
Because the just-presented results illustrated that extreme returns showed clustering, 
we tested their density around two signi  cant monetary decisions within a 500-day range 
(see Figure 5). The  rst decision was when the ECB started to decrease its prime rate on 
2 October 2008, as the subprime crisis intensi  ed. At this time, extreme currency  uctuations 
were not occurring and pricing was fuzzy, but relatively stable. Interest rate cuts were also 
insuf  cient to relax currency markets, because more extreme days occurred after this policy 
change. In addition, CEE currencies reacted even worse, which supports the idea of the 
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Figure 5  |  Appearance of Fat-Tailed Returns before and after 2 October 2008
Source: author’s calculations
The second decision is the announcement by the main central banks on 8 December 
2011 of bilateral swap agreements (Figure 6). Extreme days started to abound before this 
step, but suddenly diminished after the announcement for EUR, PLN, USD, and CZK, while 
HUF presented more extreme  uctuations, supporting the idea that pricing uncertainty has 
a country-speci  c background.
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Heteroscedasticity was managed by using univariate GARCH models, following 
Cappeiello et al. (2006), while the currencies demanded the application of less sophisticated 
models (Kiss and Kosztopulosz, 2012 - see Table 3). One-day volatility persistence was 
important according to the high level of betas, while PLN, HUF, and USD presented 
asymmetric behaviour with depreciation paired with increased volatility in contrast to USD, 
where appreciation resulted in increased volatility.
Table 3  |  Results of the Selected Univariate GARCH Models
Currency GARCH model AIC Omega Alpha(1) Gamma(1) Beta(1) Ljung–Box ARCH-LM
EUR/USD GARCH(1,1) 0.91872 0.0018 0.0385 0.9575 0.921551 0
PLN/USD GJR-GARCH(1,1,1) 1.25313 0.0102 0.0422 0.0317 0.9289 0.596078 0
CZK/USD GARCH(1,1) 1.13668 0.0059 0.0435 0.9476 0.105229 0
HUF/USD GJR-GARCH(1,1,1) 1.32693 0.0141 0.0346 0.0462 0.927 0.990811 0
USD/USD GJR-GARCH(1,1,1) 0.99846 0.004 0.059 -0.0342 0.947 0.926537 0
Source: author’s calculations
The USD currency pairs were used as control variables in Figure 7, because their 
poor correlation with CEE currencies is well known (Bubák et al., 2011; Stavárek, 2009; 
Babetskaia-Kukharchuk et al., 2008). The pre-crisis convergence between CEE currencies 
and EUR continued, supporting the  ndings of Stavárek (2009), but this decreased against 
CHF during the subprime and euro crises (Figure 2). This result suggests the value 
of examining how common movements change in different monetary environments. The 
latter results indicate bad news both for the creditors and for the debtors of CHF-based 
FCYLs. Consequently, this  uctuation provides decreasing debtor quality, damaging the 
solvency of the banking system.
Table 4 shows that these correlations had different dynamics when studied according 
to the tightening and easing policies of the ECB. The results of the t-tests presented in 
this table suggest that the decisions of the ECB helped de  ne the different collective 
types of behaviour in currency markets. First, we compared the pre-crisis era with smooth 
monetary tightening (from March 2005 to July 2007) with the crisis era with two monetary 
easing periods (from August 2007 and December 2013). The difference between the 
correlations in these periods indicates the existence of contagion in Europe. The second 
and third comparisons of the pre-crisis period with the subprime crisis (from August 2007 
to January 2010) and with the sovereign crisis (from August 2011 to December 2013) 
provided similar results.
If we focus only on CHF–CEE relations, we can still  nd signi  cant correlations, but 
the common movements are weakened in HUF and CZK, suggesting divergence in CEE. 
This inconsistency supports the idea that both banks and their clients found themselves 
in an unusual situation because of the currency market dynamics during the euro crisis. 
These results can be interpreted as follows: the bursting asset bubble-triggered crisis 
involved monetary easing, while the market became uncertain about the valuation of CEE 
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Figure 7  |  DCCs on a Daily Basis, Currencies in USD Denomination
Source: author’s calculations
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Table 4  |  Diff erent Correlations under Tightening (T) and Easing (E) by the ECB 
Currencies with CAD Denomination






t-test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100%
average T 0.6188 0.7713 0.5890 0.7672 0.8647 0.7005 0.8316 0.7933 0.7898
average C 0.5875 0.6843 0.6082 0.7926 0.8626 0.8344 0.8588 0.7720 0.8195
increase 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 56%
var T 0.0167 0.0050 0.0156 0.0053 0.0008 0.0042 0.0020 0.0071 0.0010






t-test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100%
average T 0.6188 0.7713 0.5890 0.7672 0.8647 0.7005 0.8316 0.7933 0.7898
average C 0.5839 0.6973 0.5991 0.7834 0.8120 0.8007 0.8696 0.7394 0.8001
increase 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 56%
var T 0.0167 0.0050 0.0156 0.0053 0.0008 0.0042 0.0020 0.0071 0.0010






t-test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 89%
average T 0.6188 0.7713 0.5890 0.7672 0.8647 0.7005 0.8316 0.7933 0.7898
average C 0.5900 0.6761 0.6141 0.7985 0.8950 0.8560 0.8519 0.7929 0.8319
increase 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 67%
var T 0.0167 0.0050 0.0156 0.0053 0.0008 0.0042 0.0020 0.0071 0.0010
var C 0.0320 0.0349 0.0637 0.0055 0.0014 0.0038 0.0043 0.0125 0.0052
Note: * collective behaviour, ** contagion, *** divergence
Source: author’s calculations
5.  Conclusion
Capital markets have complex network structures where crises are features instead 
of bugs. Prices can differ from their expected value and structural failures may occur 
(bank defaults such as the LTCM in 1998 and Lehman Brothers in 2008), triggering 
even fatter-tailed returns. Currency markets are relatively ef  cient compared with stock 
or bond markets (Kiss and Kosztopulosz, 2013). Nevertheless, CEE currencies have 
suffered from increased fat tailness under CHF denomination (including CZK despite its 
better fundamental background). The monetary easing policy and bilateral swap agree-
ments introduced by the ECB have reduced the occurrence of fat-tailed returns. Despite 
the relatively strong and stable CEE–EUR exchange rate, however, common movements 
have failed to provide credits in a safe haven currency such as CHF. Further, market 
panic-driven liquidity in  ows appreciated the currency and the previously strong corre-
lation was temporarily diminished. The re-emergence of the correlation even stabilised 
exchange rates at an unsustainable level from an FCYL point of view. The lesson of 
the current crisis for CEE currencies is that their relationship with CHF was altered by 
network dynamics during the subprime crisis, while the sovereign crisis was able to 
erase even the decade-old convergence. These fundamental changes negatively affected 
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the banking sector in those countries where foreign currency lending was popular 
(e.g. Hungary or Poland), especially given the lower quality of credits before 2008 in 
Hungary (Gyöngyösi, 2010), but there was room for a further decrease during the euro 
crisis. The above-described market phenomena affected all CEE currencies regardless 
of their fundamental background, but their impact on  nancial stability was determined 
by the country-speci  c pre-crisis conditions.
Central banks are legally responsible for  nancial stability, and recent changes suggest 
the necessity for a more sophisticated secondary objective for monetary policy. Despite 
the triviality of this need, it would be hard to operationalise. Indeed, recent steps towards 
creating a banking union (Darvas, 2013) or delegating supervisory powers to central banks 
(MNB, 2013, Lawson and Zimková, 2009) as well as harmonised supervision functions 
(Pelle, 2006) seem to be addressing this problem. However, sole institutional solutions 
are not enough at the national level: that is the moral of the current crisis. Even the key 
central banks were able to overcome pricing uncertainty by using enriched toolboxes with 
complete track easing on the yield curves as well as FX liquidity supply programmes. 
The current low in  ation environment supported monetary policy because  nancial and 
price stability were both manageable at the same time. However, an exit strategy would 
require more joint programmes among the ECB and CEE central banks to minimise the costs 
of bank consolidation due to FX-related bank assets.
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